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Abstract: - This paper presents the implementation of a failure propagation model for transport networks 
under GMPLS control when multiple failures occur resulting in an epidemic. We model the Susceptible 
Infected Disabled (SID) epidemic model and evaluate its behaviour and impact by adapting the signaling 
functionality of GMPLS to support epidemic failure propagation. Our results provide important input to 
epidemic connection recovery mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, transport networks, carry extremely 
large amounts of network traffic, and are widely 
spread across multiple geographical locations. As a 
result, any possible connectivity failure could 
directly impact the service delivery of a vast amount 
of users. Therefore, the network should be able to 
recover fast from a failure in order to provide 
service continuity to the user. Several recovery 
techniques have been employed by the Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) such as adding redundancy 
to network equipment (e.g. routers, optical cross-
connects, etc.), or by provisioning alternate paths 
(path protection, path restoration) X[1]X. Hence, 
assuming sufficient resources, network resilience 
can be achieved when a single failure occur (e.g. 
fiber cut). However, when it comes to simultaneous 
failures such as cascading and epidemic failures, the 
available solutions are expensive X[2]X. For 
Generalized Multi Protocol Label Switching 
(GMPLS) transport networks, network survivability 
under multiple failures has been discussed in X[3]X- X[5]X. 
Virus propagation models from the field of 
epidemiology have been altered for simulating 
network failure scenarios and the failure 
propagation probability within the network X[6]XX[7]X. 
This paper evaluates the reliability of a GMPLS 
transport network under epidemic failure scenarios. 
Thus, the aim is to increase the fault tolerance of the 
GMPLS technology when simultaneous failures 
occur impacting a large number of network nodes 
across an optical transport network (OTN) in order 
to ensure the service delivery. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 describes the GMPLS framework. Section 
3 deals with epidemic failures. The simulation study 
and its results are presented in section 4. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2 GMPLS Architecture 
GMPLS is an enhanced version of the MultiProtocol 
Label Switching (MPLS) architecture. MPLS uses 
labelled packets instead of using IP addressing for 
its forwarding decisions. In this way high switching 
performance is achieved, and at the same time 
requirements for traffic engineering are satisfied. 
The path from source to destination is called Label 
Switched Path (LSP). The network nodes, which 
support labelled paths, are called Label Switch 
Routers (LSR). MPLS LSRs have been designed to 
support only packet switching. GMPLS is extending 
the concept of label switching in order to enable it to 
work with optical networks X[8]X. Thus, switching 
technologies such as Time Division Multiplex 
(TDM), Lambda Switch Capable (LSC) and Fibre 
Switch Capable (FSC) are supported by GMPLS. 
The support of those additional switching types in 
the optical domain has driven the extension of the 
GMPLS control plane, which is now logically 
separated from the data plane. TDM, LSC and FSC 
introduce new constraints to IP addressing and to 
the routing models due to the fact that several 
hundreds of parallel physical links (e.g. 
wavelengths) are possible to exist between two 
interconnected nodes X[9]X. This separation of the 
control plane and the data plane introduced extra 
constraints, as additional control plane signalling 
techniques are required for managing the data plane 
failures. On the other hand failures on the control 
plane are not necessarily a result of data traffic 
connection failures. GMPLS details are discussed in 
the following sub-sections. 
2.1 GMPLS Routing 
GMPLS networks typically use extended versions of 
the Open Shortest Path First-Traffic Engineering 
(OSPF-TE) algorithm for their routing decisions.  
Usually rerouting is required when a failure occurs 
along the already established LSP. Under certain 
conditions it might also be necessary for a LSP to 
return back to its original tunnels, if the failed 
resource becomes re/activated (reversion) X[13]X. 
 
2.2 GMPLS Signalling 
In order to set up and tear down LSPs, GMPLS is 
making use of the Resource Reservation Protocol 
(RSVP) extensions. RSVP was initially designed to 
support Integrated Services (IntServ) in IP networks 
for reserving resources on the router in order to 
satisfy receiver initiated requests for Quality of 
Service (QoS). Therefore, when a sender wants to 
set up a connection, it is advertising its status by 
transmitting a Path message. This Path message 
traverses the network on a hop by hop basis in the 
downstream direction to one or more receivers as 
shown in Figure 1. The Path messages traverse the 
network towards the destination via intermediate 
RSVP-capable routers. Once a path message reaches 
its destination, the recipient node sends a 
Reservation (Resv) message. While the Resv 
message traverses the reversed path in the upstream 
direction to the sender, it is causing each 
intermediate node to reserve the traffic 
characteristics advertised in the Resv message.  
 
 
Figure 1: RSVP operation 
 
The development of MPLS required that RSVP 
should be extended to allow the support for Traffic 
Engineering (TE) by requesting and distributing 
label bindings X[10]X. This resulted to a modified 
version of RSVP, known as Resource Reservation 
Protocol-Traffic Engineering (RSVP-TE). RSVP-
TE messages must include the following extra 
information: 
 A Label Request object: It is included in the 
Path message and informs the downstream 
LSR that it requests a label. In the path 
message an Explicitly Route Object (ERO) 
can be included. The ERO objects consist of 
the route of the nodes until the final 
destination. 
 A Session Attribute object: Indicates the 
priority of the requested LSP. The 
downstream node will compare this 
attribute with the holding priorities of the 
already established LSPs in order to decide 
if a new LSP should be established. The 
session attribute is included in Path 
messages. 
 A Label object: It is included in Resv 
messages and informs the upstream LSR 
which label should be used as unique 
identifier for the forwarding decisions. 
 
The LSP tunnel is established in the same fashion as 
previously described and data can flow via this path. 
In order to avoid adding extra load to an already 
congested path, each node in the LSP tunnel is using 
the above information also in refresh messages; 
even if there has been no change in the tunnel’s 
state. In case an intermediate node does not support 
Label requests or has no resources available it sends 
a Path Error (PathErr) message back to source node. 
When all the data has been transmitted to the 
receiver, or the sender has no more data to send, 
they can delete the created state by respectively 
using a message for releasing the allocated 
resources (ResvTear) and a message for tearing 
down the path (PathTear). Support for Hello 
messages has been defined in RSVP-TE extensions 
for node failure detection between neighbour nodes 
X[10]X. 
 
2.3 Link Management 
The Link Management Protocol (LMP) is a point to 
point protocol which was defined in X[12]X. It 
provides a mechanism for creating and managing 
multiple control channels between adjacent GMPLS 
nodes. It supports neighbour discovery fault 
management, thus takes part in the protection and 
restoration mechanisms of GMPLS optical 
networks.  
 
3. GMPLS Survivability under 
Epidemic Failures 
Network survivability is defined as the set of 
capabilities that allow a network to recover from 
failures in a timely manner X[14]XX[15]X. In GMPLS 
transport networks the failures can be split into two 
groups: 
1. Control plane failures: for example a 
controller misconfiguration or a channel 
failure that results making the service 
delivery unmanageable. 
2. Data plane failures: directly impact the 
service delivery and could be caused by the 
failure of an element across the transmission 
line i.e. a fiber cut. 
 
3.1 General Failure Mechanisms 
In general terms failures could occur as a 
consequence of software or hardware defects, power 
outages or natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
floats, etc. Since the early start of the transport 
networks, service recovery processes have been 
defined under the term fault management as a key 
factor for improving the service availability and 
reliability. In GMPLS, fault management is taking 
place in the following 3 steps: 
1. Fault detection 
2. Fault localization and isolation 
3. Fault notification and recovery  
 
Depending of the recovery type defined by a Service 
Level Agreement (SLA) with the service provider, 
there are certain actions to be performed in order to 
switch over the traffic to alternate paths for 
recovering the service. The time it takes for 
switching the traffic to a working path is the 
recovery time T, which is calculated as follows: 
 
 
(1) 
                                            
where 
Tf is the fault detection time, 
Tl is the fault isolation time, 
Tr is the fault recovery time. 
 
In case there are not any service recovery guarantees 
(unprotected service), then no actions are 
performed. In GMPLS networks service recovery 
can be achieved by the so called protection and 
restoration mechanisms. The former defines a 
service recovery class where support for one or 
more alternate routes is required. An alternate route 
assumes that at least one redundant path has been 
provisioned and resources have been allocated pro-
actively; before a failure is detected. The restoration 
mechanism is taking place after a failure occurrence, 
when for the recovery of the service a new path 
needs to be calculated, or has already been 
calculated. Thus, after a failure notification is 
received it is decided, if resources should be 
dynamically allocated for serving this new path. 
 
3.2 Epidemic Failures 
Epidemic failure propagation has its roots in 
medical virology and relates to models on how 
diseases are spread X[11]X. The Susceptible Infected 
Disabled (SID) model was proposed as an extension 
to the SIS model in order to model the behaviour of 
an epidemic in GMPLS transport networks X[17]X. 
The SID model was proposed for dealing with 
failures, which tend to propagate over the network. 
The states listed below represent the possible 
GMPLS node states according to the SID model: 
1. Susceptible (S): State where both the 
control plane and the data plane are 
operational. 
2. Infected (I): State where the control plane 
fails, but the already established LSPs 
continue to function, i.e., data forwarding is 
not impaired. After a given period the node 
either recovers (going to S state) or 
completely fails (going to D state). 
3. Disabled (D): Both control plane and data 
plain fail representing a complete nodal 
failure. Thus any provided service stops. 
 
A susceptible node can be infected with probability 
β. When a node is at the infected state the 
restoration process starts and lasts a given amount of 
time, which is proportional to the Mean Time To 
Repair (MTTR). After this time has expired, the 
node becomes susceptible with probability δ1 or 
disabled with probability τ. In case the node 
becomes disabled another restoration process will 
take place, which has a success probability of δ2. If 
the restoration process is successful the node will 
transit to the susceptible state; otherwise, in case of 
a failure the node will remain disabled X[17]X. The 
possible transitions according to the relevant 
probabilities are depicted on XFigure 2X. 
 
 
Figure 2: SID Model X[17] 
 
The average number of infections produced by an 
infected node, called basic reproduction number 
R0, is calculated using the following formula X[5]X: 
 (2)
where λ1 > 0 is average nodal degree when a 
homogeneous network is considered. In case the 
network is not homogeneous, it has been proven that 
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency topology 
matrix (spectral radius) is a more suitable property 
for epidemic modelling X[16]X. If R0 < 1, the infection 
dies out over time. On the contrary, if R0 > 1 the 
epidemic sustains while impacting a large amount of 
nodes. In this case the proportion of susceptible (S) 
nodes is 
 
(3)
and the proportion of infected (I) and disabled (D) 
nodes is given by equations (4) and (5) respectively: 
 
(4)
 
where 
 
and 
 
 
(5)
 
3.3 Application to GMPLS Control and Data 
Plane Failures 
Failure detection is a vital part of the service 
recovery. Once a failure is detected it needs to be 
reported to the involved nodes along the LSP. Two 
control plane failures detection methods have been 
used in our work: 
1. By using a Path timer message for 
refreshing the LSP state. 
2. With the use of a Hello protocol. 
 
Data plane failures can be detected almost instantly 
by the LoL or by monitoring the Bit Error Rate. 
 
4 Simulation Study and Results 
We evaluate the SID epidemic propagation model 
using the OPNET Modeler X[18]X simulation software, 
in both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous 
network topology.  
 
For initializing the SID model a node is selected 
randomly from the network topology map and is set 
as infected. This node is the starting point for 
spreading the infection to its neighbor nodes. If the 
selected node has a high node degree it is expected 
that the infection will spread further. Whenever a 
node is entering the infection state the SID 
algorithm is executed in order to determine the time 
period a node will remain infected until it transits to 
the next state. 
 
During the period of time a node is infected and the 
control plane is failing, the node is stopping the 
transmission of any signalling messages. 
Consequently, when a node is entering the Infected 
state it performs the following actions: 
 Stop responding to any signalling messages 
by dropping all incoming messages. 
 Stop generating new connection requests 
and also stop any control plane signaling. 
 Keep the already established connections 
active. 
 Transmit the infection to its neighbours. 
 
When the node is entering the Disabled state the 
following actions are taken: 
 Release the resources which have been 
allocated for serving any active LSPs'. 
 Stop transmitting the infection. 
 
It is worth noticing that in both cases when a node is 
Infected or Disabled there is no guarantee that the 
node will return to Susceptible state after the 
recovery timer expires. This is one of the main 
differentiators of the SID model in comparison to 
previous network epidemic models. 
  
As a first step, we verify our model against 
analytical results for a homogeneous network 
networks given in [17]. The selected homogeneous 
network topology is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Homogeneous random mesh topology 
The network type is random mesh and consists of 20 
nodes. In order to verify the model the epidemic 
should persist in terms that the basic reproduction 
number R0 is greater than 1. Hence, the epidemic is 
spreading over time impacting a large amount of 
nodes. 
Due to the fact that the average nodal degree (λ) is 
highly impacting the infection propagation it has 
been used as simulation parameter for comparing 
the simulation results against the analytical values. 
Therefore, the infection and the recovery 
probabilities have been kept as constant parameters 
with the following values: β = 0.169, τ = 0.1, δ1 = 
0.3, δ2= 0.3. The values of the average node degree 
are the result of adding more links between the 
network nodes. The expected fraction of 
Susceptible, Infected and Disabled nodes has been 
calculated by using the formulas (2)-(5). The 
simulated results have been derived by 140 
simulation experiments simulating a 2 week period. 
Both infection recovery and the disable recovery 
period have been set 2 minutes. Those values are 
intentionally kept low due to the fact that longer 
recovery times will result in a pandemic when a 
homogeneous network is considered. The results 
correspond to the percentage of nodes over time for 
each state. 
Both analytical and simulation results are displayed 
on Table 1. As can be seen on the table, adding 
more links to the network increases the probability 
that an infected node will successfully transmit the 
infection to one of its neighbours. As a consequence 
the number of susceptible nodes declines while the 
value of λ increases. The analytical results have 
been calculated using the formulas for homogeneous 
networks given in [17]. 
 
% Susceptible Nodes % Infected Nodes % Disabled Nodes Avg. 
Nodal 
Degree 
(λ) 
Num 
of 
Links 
Repro-
duction 
Number 
(R0) 
State 
(S) 
Analyt. 
State 
 (S) 
Simul. 
State  
(I) 
Analyt 
State 
(I) 
Simul. 
State 
(D) 
Analyt. 
State 
(D) 
Simul. 
3 60 1.267 79 81 16 14 5 7 
4 80 1.69 59 65 31 26 1 11 
4.9 98 2.07 45 52 39 36 13 16 
Table 1: Comparison of analytical values and 
simulation results 
 
 
Figure 4: Pan European Network Topology 
The evaluated heterogeneous network topology is 
the Pan-European optical network shown in XFigure 
4X. The network consists of 28 nodes and 78 links 
interconnecting major cities located in Europe with 
average nodal degree λ = 2.7. The eigenvalues of the 
adjacency matrix have been calculated and the 
largest value is equal to 3.232. The time periods of 
the recovery timers are related to a complete node 
failure, where it might take one full working day (8 
hours) for repair. The MTTRi and MTTRd 
correspond to the different recovery times for the 
infection and the disabled state respectively. The 
value of R0 is adjusted by increasing the value of 
the infection probability β. Thus, starting from R0 < 
1 (the epidemic dies over time) the basic 
reproduction number increments by increasing the 
infection probability as shown in Table 2 XX. 
  
 Analytical Values 
β 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
R0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 4.8 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.1 
S 100% 62% 41% 31% 25% 21% 18% 15% 14% 12% 
I 0% 29% 44% 52% 56% 60% 62% 63% 65% 66% 
D 0% 10% 15% 17% 19% 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 
Table 2: Analytical values as function of beta β 
 
The percentage of the nodes for each state is 
presented as function of the basic reproduction 
number (R0). The recovery probabilities have been 
kept as constant parameters with the following 
values: τ = 0.1, δ1 = 0.3, δ2= 0.3. The results are 
presented against the analytical values for each state 
with a 95% confidence interval over 100 simulation 
experiments simulating one month timer period. The 
selected MTTRi and MTTRd are 2 and 8 hour 
respectively. Figures 5-7 illustrate the percentage of 
nodes in states S, I and D respectively, compared 
against their analytical values. Please not that the 
same formulas for the analytical values were used, 
but as the work in [17] considers homogeneous 
networks we expect some deviation between the 
simulated and the analytical values. 
 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of S states as function of R0  
 
We observe in Figure 5 that the simulation results 
for S state present a minor deviation compared to 
the analytical values however they follow the 
analytical curve.  
By looking at XFigure 6X and Figure 7 where state I 
and D are shown, the simulation results 
considerably deviate from the analytical ones. The 
deviation becomes wider for higher values of R0. 
The reason for this deviation is related to the 
characteristic of the network. The average nodal 
degree, the connectivity density, the network 
diameter and size etc. affect the simulation results, 
including the heterogeneity of the network topology.  
 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of I states as function of R0 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of D states as function of R0 
 
XA node that becomes disabled could possibly remain 
in Disabled state during the simulation period. 
Another important factor is the fraction of time 
where a node remains infected.  
 
 
Figure 8: Analytical values against the simulation 
result for the I state for different MTTRi 
 
Figure 8X illustrates that the chosen MTTRi has a 
significant impact on the average percentage of 
infected nodes in the simulation. By using only the 
MTTRi as a single simulation parameter the 
experiment took place for 4 different MTTRi while 
the MTTRd was kept to 8 hours. At an MTTRi of 4 
hours the average percentage of infected nodes 
resulted in 42% with an 95%-confidence interval 
between [39;45]. Thus the analytical value of 44% 
lies in the confidence interval given an MTTRi of 4 
hours.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of epidemic 
failure spreading in a Pan-European heterogeneous 
network. We extend the GMPLS framework to 
accommodate epidemic failure messages and model 
the SID epidemic model in OPNET. Our results 
show that the dynamic simulation follows the 
analytical values for the S and I states, whereas we 
observe some deviation in the D state due to the 
topological characteristics of the network topology.  
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